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ABSTRACT
The security of the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) cryptosystem
is relying on the Smallest-Basis Problem (SBP) and the Closest-Vector
Problem (CVP) instances. Previously, these instances were just implic-
itly mentioned and discussed without any proper deﬁnition. In this pa-
per, we explicitly deﬁned the underlying SBP instance that arose from
the GGH cryptosystem. From that, we showed how the solution to these
problems could be obtained and how the obtained solutions could lead
to the security breach in the GGH cryptosystem. Finally, we proposed
some possible strategies for strengthening the security of the GGH cryp-
tosystem.
Keywords: GGH cryptosystem, Smallest-Basis Problem, Closest-Vector
Problem, Shortest-Vector Problem.
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1. Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography emerges as one of the high potential alterna-
tives in the post-quantum cryptography era. The construction of cryptographic
schemes based on lattice-based problems instead of the number of theoretical-
based problems makes the lattice-based cryptosystems conjectured to be un-
aﬀected by the Shor's quantum attack, see Shor (1999). In Goldreich et al.
(1997) proposed a trapdoor one-way function, addressed as the GGH trapdoor
one-way function (Mandangan et al., 2018). The security of this function is
inspired by two lattice-based problems, namely the Smallest-Basis Problem
(SBP) and the Closest-Vector Problem (SVP). From the GGH trapdoor one-
way function, Goldreich et al. (1997) proposed an encryption scheme known as
the GGH cryptosystem.
The GGH cryptosystem was recognized as the ﬁrst lattice-based cryptosys-
tem with a competent level of eﬃciency and practicality. With low-cost math-
ematical operations involving matrices and vectors, the GGH cryptosystem
oﬀers a better eﬃciency level compared to the famous RSA and ElGamal cryp-
tosystems. In the security aspect, the underlying lattice-problems that arose
from the GGH cryptosystem was conjectured as invulnerable once the cryp-
tosystem is implemented in a lattice dimension of 300 and above (Goldreich
et al., 1997). Although the GGH cryptosystem is broken due to the Nguyen's
attack (Nguyen, 1999), some attempts for improving the security of the GGH
cryptosystem can be found in literature, for instance, de Barros and Schechter
(2015), Micciancio (2001), Paeng et al. (2003), Sipasseuth et al. (2019), Yoshino
and Kunihiro (2012).
Since the proposal of the GGH cryptosystem, the underlying lattice-based
problems that arose from the GGH cryptosystem were just implicitly men-
tioned and discussed. In (Mandangan et al., 2018), we deﬁned the underlying
CVP instance as the GGH-CVP instance together with the simpliﬁed versions
of this instance that are derived by the Nguyen's attack (Nguyen, 1999) and
the Lee-Hahn's attack Lee and Hahn (2010) on it. As a continuity, we proposed
the deﬁnition for another lattice-based problem that arose from the GGH cryp-
tosystem.
In this paper, we explicitly deﬁned the underlying SBP instance of the GGH
cryptosystem. From that, we investigated some features of this instance related
to the solution and the method for solving this instance. Finally, we proposed
some strategies for strengthening the security of the GGH cryptosystem. This
paper is arranged in the following ﬂow.
2 Malaysian Journal of Mathematical Sciences
On the Smallest-Basis Problem of the GGH Cryptosystem
We provide some related mathematical background in Section 2 then fol-
lowed by a brief yet necessary introduction to the GGH cryptosystem in Section
3. Furthermore, we deﬁned the underlying lattice-based problems of the GGH
cryptosystem in Section 4. Further discussion is presented in Section 5 and
conclusion remark is given in Section 6.
2. Mathematical Background
Along this paper, we standardize some mathematical notations. Firstly,
we denote m,n ∈ N. Then, all vectors are considered as column vectors and
denoted using standard vector notation. For instance, ~b ∈ Rm is a column
vector with m real entries bi ∈ ~b, for all i = 1, . . . ,m.. A set of vectors ~bi ∈ Rm,
denoted as B =
{
~b1,~b2, . . . ,~bn
}
is representable in matrix form as B ∈ Rn×n
where the vectors ~bi be the columns of the matrix B for all i = 1, . . . , n. If the
set B is linearly independent, then it can be used to span a lattice.
Deﬁnition 2.1: (Hoﬀstein et al., 2008) For m ≤ n, let B =
{
~b1,~b2, . . . ,~bn
}
be
the set of linearly independent vectors. The lattice L(B) = L ⊂ Rn generated
by the basis B is deﬁned as the set of all linear combinations of the basis vectors
~b1,~b2, . . . ,~bn with integer scalars, i.e.,
L(B) =
{
a1~b1 + a2~b2 + · · ·+ an~bn : ai ∈ Z,∀i = 1, . . . , n
}
(1)
Based on Deﬁnition 2.1, the dimension of the lattice L(B) is dim(L(B)) = n
and the rank of the lattice L(B) is rank(L(B)) = m. If m = n, then the lattice
L(B) is referred to as a full-rank lattice. This paper is dealing only with this
kind of lattice.
Theorem 2.1: (Goodaire, 2013). A square matrix is invertible if and only if
its columns are linearly independent.
Thus, the bases for the full-rank lattices are representable as non-singular ma-
trices. A lattice can be spanned by a more than one basis. Two diﬀerent bases
are mathematically related by a unimodular matrix. The matrix U ∈ Zn×n is
called a unimodular matrix if det(U) = ±1.
Proposition 2.1: (Galbraith, 2012). Let G,B ∈ Rn×n be two non-singular
matrices. The matrices G and B span the same lattice L ⊂ Rn, i.e., L(G) =
L(B) = L, if and only if G = BU where the matrix U ∈ Zn×n is a unimodular
matrix.
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When n ≥ 2, there are inﬁnitely many unimodular matrices. This implies
that the lattice in n ≥ 2 can be spanned by inﬁnitely many bases. Normally,
these bases are classiﬁed as a good basis and a bad basis. A good basis is a
lattice basis consisting of reasonably short and slightly non-orthogonal basis
vectors. On the contrary, a lattice basis with long and highly non-orthogonal
basis vectors is classiﬁed as a bad basis. The non-orthogonality of a lattice
basis can be measured by computing the dual-orthogonality defect of the basis.
Deﬁnition 2.2: (Goldreich et al., 1997). Let G ∈ Rn×n with columns ~g1, ~g2, . . . , ~gn ∈
R
n be a basis for the lattice L ⊂ Rn. The dual-orthogonal defect of the basis G
is computed as follow,
dualOD(G) =
∏n
i=1 ‖~g′i‖
|detG−1| (2)
where ‖~g′i‖ is the Euclidean norm of the i-th row vector in G−1.
To be classiﬁed as a good basis, the dual-orthogonality defect of the basis G
is required to be small, i.e, dualOD(G) is close to 1. If dualOD(G) is large and
far from 1, then the basis G is classiﬁed as a bad basis. Consider the following
deﬁnition related to successive minima of a lattice.
Deﬁnition 2.3: (Nguyen, 1999). Let L ⊂ Rn be a full-rank lattice. The i-th
minimum of the lattice L, denoted as λi (L), is the radius of the smallest sphere
centered in the origin containing i linearly independent lattice vectors.
Basically, the ﬁrst minimum of the lattice L is λ1 (L) = ‖~v1‖, where ~v1 ∈
L is shortest non-zero vector in the lattice L such that ‖~v1‖ < ‖~vi‖ for all
i = 2, . . .. Most of the lattice-based problems are related to norm or distance
minimization. The most established lattice-based problems are the Smallest-
Basis Problem (SBP), Closest-Vector Problem (CVP) and the Shortest-Vector
Problem (SVP). Any variant derived from these problems are referred to as
instance.
Deﬁnition 2.4: (Goldreich et al., 1997). Let B ∈ Rn×n be a basis for the full-
rank lattice L ⊂ Rn. Given the basis B, the Smallest Basis Problem (SBP)is to
ﬁnd the smallest basis B′ for the same lattice L where the basis B′ has a small
orthogonal defect.
Deﬁnition 2.5: (Hoﬀstein et al., 2008). Let L ⊂ Rn be a full-rank lattice.
Given a basis of the lattice L and a target vector ~t ∈ Rn, the Closest-Vector
Problem (CVP) is to ﬁnd a non-zero vector ~v ∈ L such that the Euclidean norm
‖~t− ~v‖ is minimum.
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Deﬁnition 2.6: (Galbraith, 2012). Let L ⊂ Rn be a full-rank lattice. Given a
basis for the lattice L, the Shortest-Vector Problem (SVP) is to ﬁnd a non-zero
vector ~v ∈ L such that the Euclidean norm ‖~v‖ is minimal, i.e., ‖~v‖ = λ1(L).
3. GGH Cryptosystem
Consider a communications scenario where Bob wants to send a secret mes-
sage to Alice and they agree to use the GGH cryptosystem. The key generation,
encryption and decryption algorithms of the GGH cryptosystem are given in
the following tables:
Table 1: Key Generation Algorithm done by Alice
Input Security parameter n.
Output Public key (B, σ, n) and private key (G,U).
Steps Generate the private basis G ∈ Rn×n.
Generate the unimodular matrix U ∈ Zn×n.
Compute the public basis B ∈ Rn×n as B = GU−1.
Determine the threshold parameter σ ∈ N.
Table 2: Encryption Algorithm done by Bob
Input Alice's public key (B, σ, n) and plaintext ~m ∈ Zn.
Output Ciphertext ~c ∈ Rn.
Steps Generate the error vector ~e ∈ {−σ,+σ}n.
Generate the plaintext vector ~m ∈ Zn.
Encrypt the plaintext as ~c = B~m+ ~e.
Table 3: Decryption Algorithm done by Alice
Input Bob's ciphertext ~c ∈ Rn and private key (G,U).
Output Bob's plaintext ~m ∈ Zn.
Steps Compute ~x = G−1~c.
Round each entry xi ∈ ~x to the nearest integer
bxie ∈ Z such that |xi − bxie| < 12 for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Decrypt the ciphertext as ~m = Ub~xe.
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Consider following computation in the decryption algorithm,
U ~bxe = UbG−1~ce, since ~x = G−1~c
= UbG−1(B~m+ ~e)e, since ~c = B~m+ ~e
= UbG−1B~m+G−1~ee
= bUG−1B~me+ UbG−1~ee
= bB−1GG−1B~me+ UbG−1~ee, since U = B−1G
= b~me+ UbG−1~ee
= ~m+ UbG−1~ee, since ~m ∈ Zn
To avoid the decryption error, the selection of the threshold parameter σ, which
is the entry of the error vector ~e, must be properly done based on the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.1: (Mandangan et al., 2018). Let G ∈ Rn×n be the private basis
for the lattice L ⊂ Rn and ρ ∈ R denotes the maximum l1-norm of the rows
of G−1. As long as the threshold parameter σ ∈ R satisﬁes σ < 12ρ , then no
decryption error can occur.
By determining the threshold parameter σ as required by Theorem 3.1, then
the condition bG−1~ee = ~0 can be fulﬁlled (Mandangan et al., 2018). Thus,
Ub~xe = ~m+ Ub~0e = ~m
which indicates that the decryption is done without error.
4. The Smallest-Basis Problem Instance
In this section, consider Eve as an unauthorized third party between the
communication of Alice and Bob. Suppose that Eve has Alice's public key
(B, σ, n) and Bob's ciphertext ~c. To break the GGH cryptosystem, Eve aims
to recover Bob's plaintext ~m using the available information. The security
of the GGH cryptosystem is relying on several lattice-based problems. Thus,
the most obvious way to break the security of the GGH cryptosystem is by
solving the underlying lattice-based problem instances that arose from the GGH
cryptosystem. For that purpose, Eve launches the Babai's round-oﬀ attack and
the embedding attack. Since Eve does not has Alice's private basis G, then she
could not perform the eﬀective decryption as done by Alice. The only available
information to her is the public basis of B, which is a bad basis. Suppose that,
Eve proceeds to perform the decryption using the public basis B. Before that,
consider the following proposition:
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Proposition 4.1: For σ ∈ N, let ~σ = {+σ}n, ~e ∈ {−σ,+σ}n and M ∈ Rn×n.
If bM~σe = ~0, then bM~ee = ~0.
Proof:
Consider the vector M~σ as follows,
M~σ =

m1,1 m1,2 · · · m1,n
m2,1 m2,2 · · · m2,n
...
...
. . .
...
mn,1 mn,2 · · · mn,n


σ
σ
...
σ
 =

σ (m1,1 +m1,2 + · · ·+m1,n)
σ (m2,1 +m2,2 + · · ·+m2,n)
...
σ (mn,1 +mn,2 + · · ·+mn,n)

Suppose that bM~σe = ~0. This implies that
|σ (mi,1 +mi,2 + · · ·+mi,n)| < 1
2
for all i = 1, . . . , n. Now, consider the vector M~e as follows,
M~e =

m1,1 m1,2 · · · m1,n
m2,1 m2,2 · · · m2,n
...
...
. . .
...
mn,1 mn,2 · · · mn,n


±σ
±σ
...
±σ
 =

(±σ) (m1,1 +m1,2 + · · ·+m1,n)
(±σ) (m2,1 +m2,2 + · · ·+m2,n)
...
(±σ) (mn,1 +mn,2 + · · ·+mn,n)

Assume that the k-th row of the matrix M has the maximum l1-norm, i.e.,
n∑
j=1
|mk,j | >
n∑
j=1
|mi,j |
where 1 ≤ k ≤ n for all i = 1, . . . , n and k 6= i. Consider the absolute value of
the k-th row of the vector M~e as follows,
|(±σ) (mk,1 +mk,2 + · · ·+mk,n)| = |±σ| |mk,1 +mk,2 + · · ·+mk,n|
= |σ (mk,1 +mk,2 + · · ·+mk,n)| .
Since
|σ (mi,1 +mi,2 + · · ·+mi,n)| < 1
2
for all i = 1, . . . , n, then
|σ (mk,1 +mk,2 + · · ·+mk,n)| < 1
2
as well. Since σ (mk,1 +mk,2 + · · ·+mk,n) is the largest entry in the vector
M~e, then the absolute value of each entry of the vector M~e is less than 12 as
well. Consequently, bM~ee = ~0 and this ends the proof.
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Now, consider the following attack by Eve on the GGH cryptosystem:
Lemma 4.1: Let B ∈ Rn×n be a basis for the lattice L(B) = L ⊂ Rn, σ ∈ N
be a threshold parameter, ~e ∈ {−σ,+σ}n be an error vector and ~σ = {+σ}n.
Suppose that ~y ∈ Rn such that ~y = B−1~c. If bB−1~σe = ~0, then b~ye = ~m ∈ Zn.
Proof:
Note that,
b~ye = bB−1~ce
= bB−1 (B~m+ ~e)e
= bB−1B~m+B−1~ee
= b~me+ bB−1~ee
= ~m+ bB−1~ee
since ~m ∈ Zn. Suppose that, bB−1~σe = ~0. According to Proposition 4.1, we
have bB−1~ee = ~0 as well. Therefore,
b~ye = ~m+ b~0e = ~m
which indicates that decryption by Eve succeeds.This ends the proof.
Instead of performing decryption using the bad basis B, alternatively, Eve
could use the reduced-form of the basis B. By reducing the basis B using a
lattice-reduction algorithm, the orthogonality of the bad basis B can be im-
proved. Suppose that, Eve uses the LLL-algorithm as the lattice-reduction
tool. Then, denote the LLL-reduced form of the basis B as BLLL where
dualOD(BLLL) < dualOD(B).
Now, consider the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2: Let B ∈ Rn×n be a basis for the lattice L(B) = L ⊂ Rn, BLLL ∈
R
n×n be the LLL-reduced form of the basis B such that BLLL = BT where T ∈
Z
n×n is a unimodular matrix, σ ∈ N be the threshold parameter, ~e ∈ {−σ,+σ}n
be the error vector, ~σ = {+σ}n and ~c ∈ Rn be the ciphertext vector such that
~c = B~m + ~e where ~m ∈ Zn is the plaintext vector. Suppose that ~z ∈ Rn such
that ~z = B−1LLL~c. If bB−1LLL~σe = ~0, then T b~ze = ~m.
Proof:
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Note that,
T b~ze = T bB−1LLL~ce
= T bB−1LLL (B~m+ ~e)e
= T bB−1LLLB~m+B−1LLL~ee
= bTB−1LLLB~me+ T bB−1LLL~ee
= bB−1BLLLB−1LLLB~me+ T bB−1LLL~ee
= b~me+ T bB−1LLL~ee
= ~m+ T bB−1LLL~ee
since T = B−1BLLL and ~m ∈ Zn. Suppose that, bB−1LLL~σe = ~0. According to
Proposition 4.1, we have bB−1LLL~ee = ~0 as well. Therefore,
T b~ze = b~m+~0e = ~m
which indicates that decryption by Eve succeeds.This ends the proof.
From Lemma 4.2, it can be observed that the attempt by Eve to perform
decryption using the reduced basis BLLL succeeds once the reduced basis BLLL
satisﬁes the condition bB−1LLL~σe = ~0. This condition can be met if the reduced
basis BLLL has much shorter and more orthogonal basis vectors compared to
the original basis of B.
In other words, the reduced basisBLLL must have a small dual-orthogonality
defect. Finding such a lattice basis is an SBP instance. Thus, we propose the
following deﬁnition for the underlying SBP instance that arose from the GGH
cryptosystem, addressed as the GGH-SBP instance.
Deﬁnition 4.1: Let B ∈ Rn×n be the basis for the lattice L(B) = L ⊂ Rn,
σ ∈ N be the threshold parameter and ~σ = {+σ}n. Suppose that the reduced
form of the basis B is denoted as Breduced such that Breduced = BT where T ∈
Z
n×n is a unimodular matrix. The GGH-SBP instance is to ﬁnd the reduced
basis Breduced such that dualOD(Breduced) < dualOD(B) and bB−1reduced~σe = ~0.
In Deﬁnition 4.1, we generalize the lattice-reduction algorithm to be used for
reducing the public basis of B. Eve may use any latice-reduction algorithm
such as the LLL-algorithm or any of its variants. By solving the GGH-SBP
instance, then Eve could perform eﬀective decryption as done by Alice to obtain
the plaintext ~m ∈ Zn exactly as sent by Bob to Alice.
Malaysian Journal of Mathematical Sciences 9
Mandangan, A., Kamarulhaili, H. & Asbullah, M.A.
5. Discussion
As stated in Lemma 4.1, the computed public basis B needs to satisfy
the condition bB−1~σe 6= ~0 to avoid unauthorized decryption by Eve using the
public basis B succeeds. In the GGH key generation algorithm, Alice need
to check this condition other than ensuring that the public basis B is a bad
basis. Although Alice does not know the exact entries of the error vector
~e ∈ {−σ,+σ}n generated by Bob, but Alice could check the condition since it
only involves the vector ~σ rather than the error vector ~e.
On the other hand, another condition that needs to be fulﬁlled by the pub-
lic basis B is as stated in Lemma 4.2. The computed public basis B must
bad enough with large dual-orthogonality defect and the chosen lattice di-
mension n also must large enough. This is important for ensuring that any
lattice-reduction algorithm could not eﬃciently reduce the public basis of B in
reasonable amount of time. If Eve could eﬃciently reduce the public basis B
and the condition bB−1reduced~σe = ~0 holds, then Eve could use the reduced basis
Breduced as good as Alice's private basis G to perform eﬀective decryption and
eventually break the GGH cryptosystem. These strategies can be considered
for strengthening the GGH cryptosystem and its variants.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we explicitly deﬁned the underling GGH-SBP instance of the
GGH cryptosystem. By properly and explicitly deﬁning the underlying lattice
problem instances that arose from the GGH cryptosystem, more investigation
on the features and behaviors of these instances could be done thoroughly.
From that, we could discovered more strategies for strengthening the security
of the GGH cryptosystem by preventing any potential attacks related to these
instances.
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